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Abstract. In administrative science and administrative law, public information disclosure has universally recognized as important
partway to good governance. There is an explosive recognition of the world to freedom of information act. Freedom of information
or right to information is a inseparable part of transparency principle in governance. Enacting freedom of information act is an
effort not only to make government better, but also to create trust among government, the business, and citizens. Indonesia has
enacted Act Number 14/2008 (FOI Act) and run into force in 2010, which contains 14 obligations to State-Owned Enterprises
(SOE’s). This paper will focus to elaborate SOE’s compliance with its basic obligations in this FOI Act, resulted in monitoring and
evaluation conducted by Central Information Commission (CIC); the problems; the challenges, and the opportunities. This study
used secondary data from the CIC annual ranking reports. The results show that good corporate governance is actually in line with
transparency principle, the increase of participation level of SOE’s in complying with the FOI Act, and most of SOE’s are placed
in ‘uninformative’ category.
Keywords: compliance, freedom of information, governance, state-owned enterprises, transparency

INTRODUCTION
Tranparency is generally recognized as an important element of good democracy and governance.
Public administration scholars has paid more attention to good governance and its principles. The
dynamic of administrative law can be understood
as law that govern all government personnels and
institutions, affirms their commitment to creating
good governance. Normally, administrative law is
regarded as the area of law concerned with the control
of governmental powers. One of the key function of
administrative law is to control decision-making on
the basis of powers attributed by laws. Leyland and
Anthony (2009) said that administrative law embodies general principles which can be applied to the
exercise of the power and duties of the authorities in
order to ensure that the myriad of rules and discretionary powers available to executive and other public
decision-makers conform to basic standards of legality and fairness. Administrative law or administrative
scence is characterized by operating to provide for
accountability and transparency. Cane (2011) wrote
that administrative law is part of the legal framework
for public administration. This dynamic in line with
the administrative science and administrative law
which sees the state in motion (de staat in beweging).
Transparency has long been understood in many
aspects, but it is generally recognized as a pathway
to make a better and modern government, to promote what can be named as government tranparency.
Government transparency is defined as broadly as a
governing institution’s openness to the gaze of others;
is clearly among the pantheon of political virtues; a
fundamental attribute of democracy; a norm of human
rights; a tool to promote political and economis prosperity; a means to prevent corruption; and a tool to

increase of citizen trust to government. (Fenster,
2006; Mendell, 2003; Rose-Ackerman, 1999). Jannah,
Sipahutar, and Hariyati (2020) stated that the need
to open information for government officials applies
both to the central and regional levels as a consequence of good governance. Moreover, information
disclosure is seen as vital to the eradication of corruption in all levels of government administration.
Schiavo-Campo (2019) stated that transparency
means providing reliable, relevant and timely information in forms of comprehensible to those who need
itu. Transparency is crucial for an informed executive,
legislature, judiciary, and citizen at large. It requires
the information to make available to all parties in
usable form – with clear and public regulatory and
policy-making process.
Fenster (2006) proposed two claims that support
arguments about the importance of transparency
in government. First, a government that is more
transparent is therefore more democratic. Second, a
government that more transparent will operate in a
more effective and efficient manner, and will thereby
better serve its citizens while dealing more fairly and
peaceably with other nations.
Transparency is also important to make decision
makers in government aware that what they are doing
is not necessarily in the right direction. Transparency
makes public participation is more secure, and that
public participation gives rise to more ideas and consideration for the government when making decisions.
In this context, Stiglitz (2013) wrote: “My experience
in government suggests that those who hold positions
of power want to believe that they are doing the right
thing –that they are pursuing the public interest. But
their beliefs are at least malleable enough for them
to be convinced by ‘special interest’ that what they
want is in the public interest, when it is in fact in their
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own interests to so believe”. (Note: ‘their own’, bold
by Stiglitz himself).
The most obvious form of transparency is the openness of public information, which can be seen from
the proactive provision of information by government
agencies (Article 9 and 10 of FOIA-Indonesia) and the
recognition of citizen’s rights to access public information (Article 11 of FOIA-Indonesia). The first is
commonly called as proactive disclosure of information; while the second one is information disclosure
by request. Thus, public information disclosure can
be seen from (i) the obligation of state agencies to
make available and publish public information; and
(ii) legally state recognition of citizens’ rights to
access information. Access to public information is
a kind of human rights.
Freedom of public information has been universally passed into constitution or laws. In 1980’s only
10 nations had laws that specifically guaranteed the
rights of citizens to access government information. In 1990’s, 56 countries have passed Freedom
of Information (FOI) laws or Right to Information
(RTI) laws, resulting 66 nations by October 2005.
Ackerman and Sandoval-Ballesteros (2006) call this
phenomenon as ‘the global explotion of freedom of
information laws’.
Article 19, a non-govermental organization located
in London, reported that 90 percent of world’s population live in countries that recognize cirizens’ right to
public information, and there are 118 countries that
have adopted the Right to Information Laws. This
development demonstrates worldwide recognition
of the effect of transparency on good governance.
Focused on the implication of governance disclosure, Candeub (2013) revealed conventional wisdom
holds that government, especially in its executive and
administrative capacity, must be transparent, disclosing how and why it makes decisions. He believes that
transparency limits corruption and encourages public
participation. Leyland and Anthony (2013) believed
that the acoountability of governmental institutions
is linked to their transparency. Citizens need to have
access to information relating to the functioning of
public agencies in many different contexts, For example, how decisions have been taken, the reasons for
decisions, and how money has been spent.
Indonesia is one of the 118 countries that recognize citizens’ right to information, after Act Number
14 of 2008 (then called as FOIA-Indonesia) was
enacted and declared effective two years later. In
fact, in Indonesia, recognition of this human right
is guaranteed in the constitution (UUD 1945), so
it has a stronger legal basis. Article 28F Indonesia
Constitution states “Every person shall have the
right to communicate and to obtain information for
the purpose of the development of his/herself and
social environment, and shall have the right to seek,
obtain, possess, store, process and convey information by empowering all available types of channels”.
Particularly in the context of governance disclosure
in Indonesia, the spirit of transparency is also stated
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in Act Number 30 of 2014 concerning Government
Administration (UU Administrasi Pemerintahan).
Article 51 of this Act states that Government Agencies
or Officials are required to open access to government administration documents to every citizen of
the community to obtain information unless stipulated
otherwise by law.
As a form of transparency, FOIA/RTI laws not
only guarantees citizens’ rights to access information,
but also increase citizen participation in decisionmaking, and makes public services in government
better. FOIA is intended to increase trust between
government, citizens and business entities (Hariyati
et all., 2019).
The entry of government-run business entities into
the obligations of the Public Agencies category that is
obliged to comply with the FOIA-Indonesia is not an
exaggeration. We can propose a number of reason that
can be put forward. First, public companies should
have implemented good corporate governance (GCG)
for a long time, before enacting of Act Number 14
of 2008. Second, for State Ownership Enterpreneur
(SOE’s) that have listed (go public), transparency
or openness is a legal obligation regulated in Act
Number 8 of 1995 concerning the Capital Market (UU
Pasar Modal) and Act Number 40 of 2007 concerning Limited Liability Companied. Third, openness
actually provides many benefits for corporate actions
and prevent corporation and its managers from fraud,
excessive political pressure, or any kind of corruptions. In other hands, the application of principle of
transparency is part of risk management.
Indonesia has 142 SOEs, whose core business
fields are different but some overlap with each other. It
is considered too fat, so there is a policy to make efficiency. After Miniter of SOEs Erick Thohir carried out
efficiency measures, now the number has decreased
to 107. The Minister is targeting the ideal number of
SOEs in the future to be 80 companies. Thohir also
spoke that transparancy is a requirement to encourage Indonesian SOEs to compete at the global level.
There are a number of factors that greatly affect
SOEs performance. Apart from factors related to
economics efficiency, there are also political influences. First, SOE’s performs double functions: profit
and non-profit at the same time. Second, SOEs may
be pulled to finance the social activity of government institutions or activites of politicians who were
shrouded in working visits or providing assistance to
citizens. Third, in Indonesian, SOEs is often perceived
as financial sources of politicians and political party
figure, so that the position of Board of Commissioner
member sometimes is filled with people with strong
political backgrounds (ICW, 2020). The e-KTP procurement case can be used as a concrete example
of how politicians build networks with government
officials and SOEs top leader to get financial benefits
(TII, 2017). Managers from at least four SOEs was
under investigated and interviewed by KPK because
their involvement in this case.
Seeing the position of commissioners (or directors)
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of SOEs is actually very interesting. This is because
they are the one who carry out the supervisory function, including ensuring compliance with the principle
of transparency in business operations. On the one
hand, there is a tendency to appoint commissioners of SOEs with political background; and on the
other hand, there is always the desire of politicians to
‘enter’ SOEs even though this is considered dangerous because it is prone to conflict of interest that lead
to corruption. Profiling conducted by the Ombudsman
and KPK found found 138 of the 281 active Board of
Commissioner member did not not match the seats
occupied with their competency backgrounds (Tirto,
2020). The appointment of political background commissioners can positively encourage transparency, it
is easier to lobby political power in government to
support transparency policies. By applying the principles of transparency, SOEs can actually prevent
irregularities, including excesses arising from political pressure. Decision-making in closed spaces to
accomadate political pressure can potentially disrupt
the performance of SOEs.
RESEARCH METHOD
This paper will answer the following questions:
(1) What are the obligations of Indonesian SOEs as
Public Agencies in the context of public information
disclosure?; (2) How is SOEs compliance with information disclosure based on the assessment result of
the Central Information Commission?; and (3) What
are the challenges and opportunities faced by SOEs in
applying its obligations according to FOIA-Indonesia,
include in pandemic and new normal era?
Answering these questions, we use normative
research on library materials or secondary data.
Secondary data consists of primary legal materials,
secondary legal materials, and tertiary legal materials.
Secondary data used in this study include primary
legal materials such as data for assessing the compliance of public agencies published by an authorized
institution, namely Central Information Commission.
The rest are secondary legal materials such as research
results and writings summarized in a reference list
below such scientific journals accessed through j.store
org; garuda.ristekdikti.go.id; and Westlaw; then tertiary legal materials such as dictionary.
RESULT AND DISCUSSION
(1)SOEs as Public Organs
SOEs is a business entity which all or most of
its capital is owned by the state through direct participation originating from separated state assets.
Theoritically and normatively, SOEs are established
to many objectives: (a) to contribute to the development of the national economy in general, and state
revenues in particularly; (b) pursuit of profit; (c)
administering public benefits in the form of providing goods or services of high quality and adequate
for the fulfillment of the livelihoods of many people;
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(d) pioneering business activities that are not yet able
to be implemented by the private sector and cooperatives; and (e) actively participate in providing
guidance and assistance to small and medium enterprises, cooperation, and community.
FOIA-Indonesia basically adheres to the universal
rule that every citizen has the right to obtain public
information from Public Agency. Which institutions
are included in the the category of Publik Agencies
differ from country to country. In the process of
enacting FOIA-Indonesia has become a long discussion. Generally accepted, public agencies include all
organs in executive power or government administration bodies. But there are also those regulate broader
institutions, include certain private company.
There are at least two reasons that can be put forward. The first reason, derived from the point of view
of government actions (bestuurhandelingen). This
means any action carried out by the governmental
institutions (bestuursorgaan) in functioning government tasks and goals. Government action can be in
the form of material action (feitleijke handelingen)
and legal action (rechtshandelingen). In administrative law, what is important to pay attention to is legal
action because it will have legal consequences for
the people affected by those actions (Ridwan, 2017).
Based on kind or type of action, government actions
are differentiated into public legal actions and private
legal actions. The presence of the state in the form of
SOEs is an act of the state in the realm of private law.
If government actions in the public sphere must apply
transparency, then in the private sphere it must also
be open, unless it is declared confidential or secret.
To find out whether a government action is public
or private, we can look at the position of the government officials in carrying out any kind of action. If
government official acts in quality as government,
then what applies is public law. Conversely, if a government agency is involved in civil society such as
rent a car or house then it is subject to private law
(Ridwan, 2017). In this context, it can be seen that
most SOEs whose funds come from separated SOEs
assets are subject to regulations regarding corporations, namely the Limited Liability Company Law.
The second one, Indonesia embraces a broader
view of public agencies, not only government agencies, but also business entities, political parties, and
possibly non-governmental organizations. All state
organs under the executive, judiciary and legislature
are public agencies. Other agencies are also qualified
as public agencies based on two criteria, namely (a)
their main functions and duties; and (b) funds used.
Criterion (a) includes all institutions whose main
functions and duties are related to the administration of the state are public agencies, for example the
Corruption Eradication Commission and state auxiliary organs. Criterion (b), which has been the focus
of debate so far, includes all institutions whose funds
are partly or wholly sourced from the APBN/APBD
(National Budget and Expenditure/Local Budget
and Expenditure), including non-governmental
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organizations if part or all of the funds come from
the APBN/APBD, public donations or donations from
abroad.
Historically, during law-making process of FOIA
Bill, there was resistance to the qualify SOEs as a
Public Agency. Civil society groups who’s participated in discussing this bill, urged the government and
the DPR as legislators to include SOEs and political
parties, considering that the state funds used by these
two entities are very large. Finally, through debate and
lobby, SOEs was still recognized as a public agency.
As a consequence, SOEs have the same rights and
obligations as other public agency, including serving requests for information from the public. The
affirmation in the law does not eliminate the debate
in the academic world regarding the position of SOEs
as a public agency. In cases of information disputes
handled by the Information Commission and the
Courts, SOEs have been firmly declared as public
agencies. For exampes, in the case of LSM Peduli
Mutu Pendidikan Nasional versus PT Pertamina
(Persero) (verdict No. 038/VII/KIP-PS-M-A/2015),
dan Suherly Harahap versus PT Hutama Karya
(Persero) (verdict No. 062/XII/KIP-PS-A/2016).
(2)Miracle 14
Oxford English Dictionary defines word ‘miracle’
as : (1) act or event that does not follow the laws
of nature and is believed tu be caused by God; (2)
lucky thing that happens that you did not expect or
think possible. We prefer use word ‘miracle’ in this
contex as a ‘lucky thing’ because number 14. We
can see SOEs as a Public Agency is regulated in an
Act number 14, its obligations are outlines in Article
14, and there are 14 items of SOEs obligations. The
‘miracle’ of the number 14 was not intended in the
law-making process.
The following table shows 14 points of SOEs obligations in the context of public information disclosure.
From the 14 liabilities in FOIA-Indonesia, most
of them relate to the company's finances or financial
aspects such as annual reports, financial reports, profit
and loss accounts, and the allocation of remuneration
funds for the company's directors and commissioners. However, some points of obligation are not
something that is difficult to carry out. For example,
Table 1. SOE Obligations in the context of public
information disclosure
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information relating to the identity of the company
and its shareholders; guidelines for the procurement;
the mechanism for determining the board of directors and commissioners; and corporate governance
guidelines.
Basically, only information relating to finance,
audit results, and legal cases that relatively contains
exempt information. If they consider that information is confidential, SOEs can determine which
information is exempt based on a consequence test.
The privatization process and the procurement, for
example, contain confidential information because it
is related to the objective of maintaining fair business
competition. It includes legal grounds for determining confidential information. However, it is wrong
to consider all financial information as confidential
information. In fact, Schauer (2014) said transparency can foster accountability and prevent the misuse
of funds and the abuse of power. Transparency is
undoubtedly effective in lessening the incidence and
consequences of official and institutional decision financial and otherwise- that reflect incompetence,
malice, or incentives at odds with those of the public
interest.
The type of public information managed by SOEs
is actually more than 14 items as quoted above.
There are two main reasons that can be put forward.
First, the general provisions regarding the obligations of public agencies set out in Articles 9-11 of
FOIA-Indonesia also apply to SOEs. The types of
information can be in the form of: (a) information
that must be provided and announced periodically;
(b) information which must be announced immediately; and (c) information which must be available
at all times. Second, the Ministry of SOEs has also
regulated various types of information which are
its obligations, which are contained in an internal
regulation, namely the Minister of SOEs Regulation
Number 08/MBU/2014 concerning Guidelines for
Information Management and Documentation in the
Ministry of SOEs, as revised by the Minister of SOEs
Regulation Number 12/MBU/10/2015.
(3)SOEs Compliance
As a business entity, some of which are publicly
listed companies, SOEs are subject to the principles of
good corporate governance. Act Number 19 of 2003
concerning SOEs mentions the word “information”
11 times and the word “transparency” 5 times. Article
5 requires the Board of Directors to comply with the
SOEs Articles of Association and must implement
the principle of transparency. The principle of transparency should ne applied in the restructuring and
privatization processes.
In fact, GCG has become a standard guideline,
and become the "spirit" of SOEs operational. Many
SOEs have announced that they have obtained universally accepted compliance standards such as ISO,
which means that companies adhere to good corporate
governance. There are five basic principles of GCG
that are universally recognized, namely transparency,
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accountability, responsibility, independence and fairness. Transparency can be defined as the disclosure
of information both in the decision-making process
and in disclosing material and relevant information
regarding the company's activities. Daniri (2014)
states that companies must provide sufficient, accurate, and timely information to various parties with an
interest in the company. Each company is expected to
publish financial and other information that is material
and has a significant impact on company performance.
Investors must be able to access important company
information easily when needed. One of the benefits
derived from the principle of transparency is that
stakeholders can know the risks that may occur when
conducting transactions with SOEs.
SOEs compliance in fulfilling its obligation to
convey public information can actually be done by
looking directly at the website of each SOEs. This
means that a comprehensive study of the 107 available SOEs is necessary. According to FOIA-Indonesia
(Article 13) and Government Regulation Number 61
Year 2010, two main aspects that have been part of
the compliance assessment of public agencies are
the appointment of an Information Management and
Documentation Officer (Pejabat Pengelola Informasi
dan Dokumentasi/PPID), and the existence of internal
regulations governing information management. In
this paper, SOEs compliance will be seen based on
the publication of the assessment that has been carried
out by the Central Information Commission.
The view of Coffee (1984), as cited by Nasution
(2001), can be referred to to remind the basis for
thinking about the urgency of disclosure principles for
SOEs. First, because information has various characteristics as public goods, research on company shares
is less available, resulting in verification of information received by the public (issuers). A mandatory
disclosure system can be seen as a strategy to reduce
the cost of seeking information. Second, it is generally recognized that greater inefficiencies will occur
without mandatory disclosure systems because investors will incur more costs to pursue profits. Third, the
voluntary disclosure system practiced by a number
of companies has proven unsatisfactory. Information
stored only by the company's top managers can misinform the market, perhaps even plunging top managers
into the insider trading trap. Fourth, in an efficient
capital market environment, there is a lot of other
information that SOEs investors may need to optimize
their investment. Such information is best provided
through a mandatory disclosure system.
Participation
Participation is very important in encouraging
information disclosure. One of FOIA-Indonesia's
goals is "to encourage public participation in the
public policy making process". The success of a
policy or program is determined by the participation
of stakeholders.
In the context of information management and
services, there are three participation rooms that will
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Graph 1. SOE’s participation in monitoring and evaluation
of Public Agencies, 2015-2019

be filled by SOEs. The first room is the management
of information in the internal environment through
the development of information systems. Article 7 (3)
of FOIA-Indonesia states that Public Agencies must
build and develop information and documentation
systems to manage public information properly and
efficiently so that it can be accessed easily. Website
can be used to publish information. By using technology, SOEs can serve public easily. Second, outward
participation in the form of service when there is a
request for information from an Indonesian citizen or
legal entity, when there is an assessment of the disclosure of public information, or when it is necessary to
resolve information disputes at the tribunal stage (out
of court settlement). Third, participate in the sense
of being present at the courtroom if an information
dispute ends in court. In this dispute process, SOEs
must fight for their arguments for administrative justice. Information disputes occur if the SOEs does not
provide the requested information; SOEs provides
information but not as requested; has not provided
information by the time specified; or SOEs charge
excessive fees.
The level of participation here is intended as the
level of participation of SOEs in the information disclosure assessment process conducted by the Central
Information Commission. Not participating does not
fully mean that the SOEs concerned is very closed.
All SOEs convey information through electronic and
non-electronic channels. The Central Information
Commission's assessment is far from merely the
existence of a company website.
The Graph 1 above shows us that in the first two
years (2015 and 2016) the participation rate of SOEs
following the assessment did not increase because the
numbers were both 51. The lowest participation, only
25 out of 118 public agencies, occurred in the assessment period in 2017. The next two years the number
of public agencies participating in The assessment has
increased, but on the other hand, the number of targeted SOEs has decreased from 111 to 109. In terms
of percentage, there is an increase in participation
from 50.45 percent in 2018 to 55.96 percent in 2019.
Compliance Score (Informativness)
Using five assessment categories, the Central
Information Commission has conducted assessments
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of public agencies. "Informative" means that the
Public Agency has a score of 90-100. The category
'Towards Informative' is obtained if the score is
80-89.9; 'Quite Informative’ means a score of 60-79.9
is obtained; a 'Less Informative' score is 40-59.9; and
"Uninformative" means getting a score less than 40.
The assessment criteria are determined by the Central
Information Commission.
Based on the scoring, it can be seen that most
SOEs are in the uninformative category. The table
below shows that very few SOEs have successfully
entered the 'informative' and 'informative' spaces. In
2015 there was actually one SOEs that got a score
above 90, but in the next two years the total was 0.
In 2018, there were two SOEs that were categorized
as' informative, and the following year there was
only one SOEs. If illustrated in graphical form, the
Informativeness Score of SOE’s is as follows.
Graph 2. The Informativeness Score of SOE’s

The large number of uninformative SOEs was contributed by at least two basic things: first, SOEs did
not carry out the basic obligations stated in Article
14 of FOIA Indonesia; and second, the low level of
SOEs participation in the assessment, even though it
is actually easier because it uses the self-assessment
method. The management of SOEs in Indonesia has
not been completely free from the mindset of secrecy.
It seems as if what SOEs are doing is not known to
the public, even though the SOEs budget actually
comes from funds collected from the people. In addition, most SOEs were categorized as Uninformative
because they did not return the self-assessment files
sent by the Central Information Commission assessment team.
The Central Information Commission, which carries out the compliance rating, has reported to the
government and the public that public information
disclosure in Indonesia is still far from the goal mandated by FOIA. It is evident that there are still many
public agencies that do not carry out the mandate
of FOIA, and SOEs make major contributions in a
negative sense. This condition can be seen from the
concept of people's obedience to regulatory obligations. An institution will fully fulfill its obligations if
it affirms rational acceptance (rationale aanvaarding).
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The degree of compliance can be determined
by consideration of the benefits obtained. A Public
Agency is more obedient than another because it benefits from the public information disclosure ranking.
SOEs that have received top rankings in previous
years always join the the following year awarding
because there are benefits related to the company’s
brand. Moreover, from a sanction perspective, compliance with obligations is also determined whether there
is a sanction for a Public Agency. Sanction or openly
disputes can damage company’s business reputation.
If the measure is compliance with FOI Laws, then it
is true what Vinogradoff (1949) wrote: “Law has to
be considered nor merely from the point of view of
its enforcement by the Courts; it depends unitimately
on recognition. Such a recognition is a distinctly legal
fact; although the enforcement of a recognized rule
may depend on moral restraint, the fear of public
opinion, or eventually, the fear of popular rising ".
Comparation
To see the low position of SOEs compliance with
information disclosure, it can be compared with the
public institutions of State Universities (PTN). The
comparison with PTN is based more on the relatively
close number of public agencies. In 2019, there were
85 PTNs and 109 SOEs that were targeted for assessment. PTN participation rate reached 92.94 percent
(79 public agencies); much higher than the participation rate of SOEs which only reached 55.96 percent.
In the same period, there were 5 PTNs that were
categorized as 'Informative'; followed by 'Towards
Informative' (5), 'Quite Informative' (17), 'Less
Informative (21), and' Uninformative’ (37). Compare
this with SOEs, which are far below in number,
namely Informative (1), Toward Informative (1),
Fairly Informative (8), Less Informative (6), and
Uninformative (93). The compliance of SOEs in the
Informative category is the same as that of political
parties, but the number is far below the category of
other public agencies, Non-Structural Institutions,
State Institutions and Non-Departmental Government
Agencies, and Provincial Governments. This comparison shows that SOEs is still inferior to other public
agencies in fulfilling the obligation to disclose public
information.
The following graph shows a comparison of the
compliance of SOEs and other public agencies in the
2019 ranking.
This comparative study strengthens the assumption that many public agencies have not complied
with and carried out their obligation to provide public
information. However, the experience of SOEs shows
a very striking figure. The number of “Uninformative”
SOEs is nine times the number of provinces, and 23
times the number of ministerial public agencies with
the same status.
What causes the level of compliance of SOEs to
be lower than other public agencies is not a single
factor. It could be because the closure mindset has
not completely disappeared; consideration of the
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Graph 3. Comparison of the Compliance of SOEs
and Other Public Agencies in the 2019

benefits of rating for corporate activities; the view
as a private company that is not the same as other
government agencies; have conveyed transparency
through the capital market so that there is no need
to convey similar information to the public; and has
not placed public information management as one of
the priority scales.
Cases, Barriers and Opportunity
This data is a big question mark because basically
transparency is part of SOEs operations. Corporate
disclosure has long been viewed in many public
policy discussions as “a way to reduce firms' problems. There are good reasons why disclosure can
increase the value of the firm. For instance, reducing
the asymmetry of information between those inside
the firm and those outside can facilitate a firm's
ability to issue securities and consequently power
its cost of capital (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2012).
Asymmetric information occurs when one party has
relevant information in the legal relationship between
the two parties, while the other party does not have
the information.
Confidentiality or secrecy is often used by SOEs
as an excuse for refusing to provide information to
applicants. One example of a case is the petition by
Sutarno vs the Ministry of SOEs (decision No. 066/V/
KIP-PS-MA/2014. The applicant asks for a copy of
the 2010-2012 Perum PPPD Articles of Association,
including the Company's Budget Work Plan. SOEs
stated that the information requested is confidential.
Is the Company Budget Work Plan (RKAP) classified
as confidential? Is the company budget of a SOEs
not accessible to the public? In the end, the Central
Information Commission decided the information
requested was open.
The confidentiality argument is used by SOEs
management in many cases of requests for SOEs
agreements with third parties. In such cases, there is
very little difference between protecting intellectual
property and covering up potential irregularities and
corruption in the agreement. Often, the reasons for
confidentiality are actually not basic, and are not preceded by a consequence test and a test of the public
interest (Jannah and Sipahutar, 2017).
The case citation above do not mean that SOEs
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does not have exemption. Referring to Article 17 of
FOIA-Indonesia, SOEs can exclude information. It
is interesting to point out another example which
strengthens the decision of SOEs to state that the
information requested is confidential. An Indonesian
citizen from Kuta Alam Banda Aceh has requested
information from a state-owned company, Pertamina,
in the form of a list of names of companies that purchased fuel oil (BBM) for industrial needs in Aceh
Province in the 2010-2016 period and the amount
purchased by each. company in the period. At first
glance, the information requested by the applicant
is overwhelming due to the long period of time and
possibly the large number of companies.
Interestingly, this seemingly simple case has
gone through a lengthy administrative process and
the results have changed. Pertamina has refused to
provide the requested information on the pretext of
being confidential. The Petitioner has submitted a
request for public information dispute resolution to
the Central Information Commission for the refusal
of SOEs. On May 23, 2018, the Central Information
Commission decided the information requested was
open information. The interpretation of whether the
requested information is open or not is changed at
Central Jakarta District Court. This time, the petitioner filed a cassation to the Supreme Court.
In August 2019, the Supreme Court decided to
reject the appeal submitted by citizens. The judge who
tried this case stated that the information requested
was included in the category of exempt information, so it was confidential. The confidentiality of
this information refers to the Law on Trade Secrets,
propriety, and public interest. The judge was of the
opinion that closing the requested information could
protect a greater interest, namely healthier business
competition for the interests of the industrial fuel user
community (Supreme Court Decision Number 664 K/
dt.Sus-KIP/2019, Safaruddin vs PT Pertamina).
In order to solve the problem of compliance with
public information disclosure in SOEs, the role of the
Audit Committee or the Company's Compliance Unit
is actually needed. In the banking world, for example,
the Compliance Director is commonly known. This
committee (or under other names) is legally obliged
to form company management. Its duty is "to ensure
that there is a satisfactory review procedure of all
information issued by SOEs".
One of the goals of the FOIA is to prevent corruption. The problem is that SOEs in Indonesia is not
yet completely free from corrupt practices involving
company management. Assistance by the KPK, for
Figure 1. Dispute Information Scheme
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example through the Study on the Implementation of
GCG in SOEs (2007) and the Study of Anti-Corruption
Initiatives on SOEs (2011), did not completely eliminate the intention of corruption. Later, a SOEs was
even named as a suspect in a corporate crime. This
is partly influenced by corporate disclosure that has
not been fully implemented. The management of
SOEs has not been separated from political pressure.
Jabotinsky and Siems (2018) mention the existence of
political pressure 'might undermine their professional
judgment and lead to suboptimal decision-making'.
The involvement of politicians in managing SOEs is
like a double-edged sword. On the one hand, SOEs
need to get political support, especially in terms of
state financing. On the other hand, the entry of many
politicians into SOEs management can divert the
direction of SOEs management. Indonesia has not
completely separated from what MacIntyre (1990)
called 'vigorous political bargaining', and instead led
to the failure of SOEs privatization in the New Order
era (Ma'arif, 2018; Infobank, 2019).
In fact, filling top leader positions in SOEs is not
entirely based on the needs and principles of GCG.
The World Bank (1995) has long been concerned
about this, with the following sentence: Consequently,
politicians everywhere carefully weigh any changes
in state-owned enterprise policy, naturally preferring
policies that benefit their constituencies and help them
remain in office over policies that undermine support
and may precipitate their removal.
Drastic and dramatic changes in the last few years
due to technological developments affecting the business world, and actually become a good momentum
and opportunity for SOEs. Companies can use the
available information and data for future improvement. By quoting the views of Nonaka and Takeuchi
(2019), SOEs can fill some opportunities, in national
level or international level, by using information and
communication technology. In other words, there are
almost no obstacles for SOEs to manage and provide
public information because the development of information technology has made everything easier. Evans
and Wurster (2000) explained that fundamentally
information and the mechanism for delivering it are
the glue that holds together the structure of business.
With information technology, information service
officers are made easier when there is a request for
information. The availability of personnel in charge
of managing and providing information and funds is
an inevitable condition. Why? In the framework of
information disclosure, public agencies are required
to appoint an PPID officer, and automatically compile
their organizational structure, in order to carry out the
function of managing and serving public information.
The information managed by the Public Agency is
relatively large, so it requires a lot of funds. The three
documents containing this information will be created
in the form of archives, libraries and digitization.
In the future, it seems important for SOEs to implement several compliance keys to FOIA-Indonesia.
First, updating public information that is managed
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and utilizing the digital era. Second, continue to
maintain a consistent and simple open information
policy. Third, maintain and implement confidential
information security, and prevent information leaks.
Fourth, a governance approach that is proactive rather
than reactive.
CONCLUSION
It can be concluded that SOEs is a Public Agency
that has the obligation to convey public public information both to the public without having to request
it. Although the source of SOEs finance is separated
state assets, it is a business entity that is subject to
Act Number 14 of 2008.
Based on the results of the ranking conducted by
the Central Information Commission, it turns out that
the participation rate of SOEs is still very low; and
the number of SOEs that fall into the informative
category is very minimal. The secrecy mindset still
exists, and is used as an excuse for refusing to provide
information to the public.
There are still many challenges faced by SOEs,
especially preventing fraud and irregularities, which
can actually be prevented and minimized through
serious transparency. The development of information
technology and the SOEs transformation program are
unfortunate opportunities to be missed. Guidelines
for managing information and handling information
disputes are very important for every SOEs.
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